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• 
Death is the most brutal of all words in any language. It is 
the ultimate end, the finality of all. The cessation of both 
physical life and personhood. In a normal, healthy life, death is 
an issue that is left unspoken, but feared. Medicine has learned 
to extend life, but now it may extend physiological life long after 
the loss of individual personhood (the individual's uniqueness 
which makes one a distinct person). 
Society now faces tremendous moral, ethical and personal 
challenges in dealing with the difficulties of persons who, while 
technically alive, have lost the ability to function as 
individuals. Some suffer debilitating pain, excruciating and 
permanent. Some live only due to medicine's machinery, the only 
sign of life a heartbeat, respiration and occupancy of physical
• 
space. These dilemmas have given an old word new meaning in 
today's society - Euthanasia. 
DEFINING EUTHANASIA 
Euthanasia is the action of one individual killing another 
individual for reasons considered to be merciful. This is no new 
term. Some early supporters of euthanasia include Plato, 
Aristotle, and Luther (Thomasma &Graber,1990,p.l). Euthanasia was 
also part of the Utopian society created by Thomas More in the 
sixteenth Century (p.5?). It takes on many other names too, 
depending on the action, individual consent and one's moral concept 
of life and death. 
Euthanasia can be either be active or passive. Passive 
• euthanasia is allowing one to die by not acting to stop death or 
• 
taking an action to prolong life no longer. Active euthanasia 
however, requires a direct action to cause death. The differences 
between active and passive euthanasia can be black and white, or 
fall into a gray area that makes it seem to be of little or no 
difference in terms of consequences. The consequences in both 
cases are the same: Death. The circumstances of morally accepting 
active euthanasia are also the same: The loss of functional 
personhood, irreversible pain that medicine cannot ease, and 
intolerable pain that debilitates the individual's quality of life. 
Additionally, both passive and active euthanasia are morally 
acceptable under the principles of autonomy, right to privacy, and 
mercy. 
• PASSIVE EUTHANASIA - DO NOT RESUSCITATE, NO HEROIC MEASURES AND THE 
WITHHOLDING, OR FOREGOING OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT. 
Passive euthanasia is the deliberate act of allowing one to 
die by withholding, or withdrawing, of medical interventions which 
artificially sustain life. This allows death to be the natural 
consequence of a terminal illness or accident. Passive euthanasia 
is now referred to as "foregoing life-sustaining treatment" by most 
medical ethicists (SCUlly & Scully,1988,p.112). This withholding, 
or foregoing, of medical treatment constitutes euthanasia because 
of an active decision to allow death to occur. This has become a 
daily event in American society, accepted morally (autonomy), 
legally (right to privacy), and medically (the right to refuse 
• 
treatment). However we may wish to term passive euthanasia, it is 
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the action of taking no action. To take no action is in itself an 
action, hence, the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment is 
euthanasia. Do not resuscitate, take no heroic (or extraordinary) 
measures, and the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment are all 
distinctly passive euthanasia. They are also deaths of mercy and 
humaneness. 
• 
The acceptance of passive euthanasia has essentially led to 
the end of practical debate over its morality. Any further debate 
is "flogging a dead horse" (Fletcher,1973,p.150). The right to 
privacy, right to refuse treatment and respect for individual 
autonomy have been upheld as constitutional rights in both the 
Cruzan and Quinlan cases. These two cases provide bedrock 
standards in the moral justification and legal right of passive 
euthanasia: Expressed consent by a competent patient (or by 
surrogacy in the best interest of the patient) and the medical 
decision that life has ceased mentally (brain-death), or that there 
is nothing more that may be done. 
MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF PASSIVE EUTHANASIA 
• 
Moral justification of passive euthanasia lies in two distinct 
factors that are determinants of allowing one to die with dignity. 
First, the expressed consent of a competent (or formerly competent 
patient) to be euthanized and under what conditions. This consent 
can come as clear and convincing testimony from the family, the 
individual, or by a living will. For the euthanasia to be morally 
justified, it must be the expressed wish of a competent patient. 
3 
• 
Living wills present the patient's expressed wishes to the 
family and doctor, establish the guidelines of care to be followed 
and state when medical intervention is to be discontinued. 
California became the first state to pass a natural death statute 
and acknowledge the legitimacy of living wills (Scully & 
ScullY,1988,p.100). Thirty-eight states now recognize living wills 
and the "right to die". By creating guidelines in a living will, 
the expressed consent of the competent patient is legally 
expressed. 
• 
The second determining factor is that the patient's life as 
the person he or she was is over. It is now widely accepted, in 
the medical definition of death, that brain death constitutes 
death. If one is in a persistently vegetative state, has no signs 
of brain activity (cerebral), or cannot live without artificial 
means, then passive euthanasia is morally justified. In the case 
of the loss of personhood, such as in the end stage of terminal 
disease, passive euthanasia is acceptable, but only with expressed 
consent. 
Most religions accept the principle of death with dignity and 
that life ends, in some cases, before physiological death 
(Larue,1985,pp.1-148). This allows for the moral acceptance of 
passive euthanasia and the right for an individual to choose death. 
Pope Pius XII stated that there was no moral obligation to maintain 
life when there was no hope for recovery (Colen,1976,p.58). Joseph 
Fletcher (1973) adds that, "ministers, priests and rabbis recognize 
• 
the moralness of 'negative euthanasia' more than the medical 
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institution (p.150). (Appendix A shows the position of major 
religions in fuller detail). 
To argue further the morality of passive euthanasia is 
unnecessary • Passive euthanasia is a daily fact of life in 
hospitals, nursing homes and hospices nationwide. The only 
difference is the phrasing of passive euthanasia in the more 
palatable terms of do not resuscitate, take no heroic measures and 
the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment. It is not immoral to 
recognize that one's personhood no longer exists even though there 
are physiological signs of life; it is merciful. 
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
In active euthanasia the principles of autonomy and the right 
•	 to privacy are not the only determining factors of morality. The 
principles of humanness and compassion also become determining 
factors in order to justify morally the act of relieving sUffering 
by causing death. In active euthanasia it is not the disease or 
injury one dies as a result of, rather, it is as a result of a 
deliberate act to cause death. Though the death is not the direct 
result of the disease or trauma, it is a consequence of it; the 
death occurs from an action to relieve the sUffering caused by the 
disease. 
The requirement of aid to cause death is what most find 
morally apprehensible, especially if it is a physician. Leon Kass 
(1990) finds a "primary impediment within the very doctor-patient 
• 
relationship" to actively euthanize, especially with the doctor's 
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role of a healer (Thomasma & Graber,p.148). This would have even 
further impact on the pUblic I s view of doctors and medicine 
(p.149). When it comes to the relief of endless sUffering and 
medicine offers no relief, what is it one ought to do? The 
Hippocratic Oath requires a doctor to both preserve life and 
relieve suffering (Fletcher,1960,p.64). This creates a dilemma for 
the physician as well as the patient. 
• 
Every day we determine that there is a time when sUffering and 
misery ought to be relieved. We morally accept this philosophy in 
passive euthanasia, abortion and in the active euthanasia of 
species other than humans. In those acts we use the terms humane, 
merciful, painless. In fact, we find it a moral obligation to put 
animals of another species "to sleep" because they suffer, are 
stray, or have bitten. 
Ecclesiastes 3:19-20 says, "For the fate of the sons of men 
and the fate of beasts is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. 
They all have the same breath, and man has no advantage over the 
beasts, for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the 
dust, and all turn to dust again"(Cogden,1977,p.72). Is one 
morally correct to justify euthanasia for another animal species 
for the painless relief of SUffering and in turn say it is immoral 
to do the same for man? Can there really exist a religious 
acceptance of the euthanization of one species which is said to be 
an equivalent in the Bible and intolerance for the relief of human 
SUffering? 
• 
Truly a SUffering animal ought to be put to sleep; it is the 
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morally just thing one ought to do. However afraid of death one 
might be, it is morally unjust to dictate that another must 
permanently suffer and live a life in misery. Eventually one loses 
personhood as a result, and consequently becomes dehumanized 
(Fletcher,1960,p.67). The sanctity of life and the right to life 
ought to be our most important right, but eventually we all lose 
that right and death comes to all. circumstances do exist that 
morally justify, if not obligate, one to perform a deliberate act 
to relieve suffering when there is no reversibility, no relief for 
the pain, and there is no chance to live the life one formerly had. 
MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
If one reads the volumes of articles about active euthanasia, 
•	 he/she will find numerous arguments for and against active 
euthanasia. All of these arguments are valid and morally correct, 
but how can what one sees as a moral act be an immoral act to 
another and vice versa? It is in respect for the autonomy of 
another person and respect for another to make choices about his or 
her own life. Just as it is immoral to decide another's religious 
beliefs, or what their importance to society is, who is just to 
determine that another's pain is or isn't SUffering? Who ought to 
determine that another should be euthanized to ease his or her 
SUffering? To both of those questions the answer is, "No one"! 
No one person is morally justified in determining that 
another's life is or isn't worth living. To one individual, the 
• 
pain may be too much and there exists no quality of life. For 
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another, his or her value of the sanctity of life may be one in 
which pain is of no consequence. It is the individual who, 
according to their beliefs, must choose. Morally, no one else may 
do it for them. 
If one objects to euthanasia on the grounds of their belief, 
either theistically or by their value of life, then, that objection 
for that person is valid, and morally acceptable. If one's center 
of life has become tortuous pain that cannot be relieved, then he 
or she has the right to choose an end to the sUffering. If 
medicine's responsibility is to relieve sUffering and cannot, then 
what is wrong with allowing one to seek medical relief of his or 
her suffering through euthanasia? 
There is little substantive argument left when we have found 
• 
both passive euthanasia and abortion morally accepted and 
constitutionally protected rights. Federal JUdge Barbara 
Rothstein, in her decision against Washington voters who voted to 
turn down Initiative 119, a proposal to legalize physician assisted 
euthanasia, found no "constitutionally meaningful difference 
between the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment and the 
provision of the medical means to end life in the case of 
terminally ill, competent patients"(Commonweal,1994,p.A32). Since 
passive euthanasia is a deliberate act of not taking action to 
sustain life, and abortion a deliberate act of involuntary active 
euthanasia, there seems to be no distinct moral difference between 
active and passive euthanasia. 
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THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT AGAINST EUTHANASIA
• Many refer to the "slippery slope" to argue against active 
euthanasia. This argument holds that if we accept this act of 
helping another to die, we will legitimize suicide (Kass, 
1991,p.20), will allow the mentally ill to be euthanized, have mad 
doctors euthanizing at their will (not the will of the patient). In 
the extreme of this type of argument, our society will degrade to 
that of a "Nazi Germany". But while we hold the terminally ill, 
sUffering, and consenting competent patient accountable for 
remaining alive, the moment they become artificially sustained or 
slip into coma they are passively euthanized! 
The slippery slope argument holds validity only when argued in 
the terms of the principle of nonmaleficence, that one ought to do 
• 
no further harm to a patient (Beauchamp and Childress,1994,p.230). 
The principle of nonmaleficence does not distinguish between no 
further harm and the relief of sUffering, nor does it mention 
mercy. It is immoral to allow one to needlessly suffer when that 
sUffering entirely replaces the individual's quality of life. It 
is humaneness that dictates an end to the suffering. 
Nonmaleficence is to do no further harm, and when the pain is 
intolerable, cannot be remedied and is in itself harmful, then 
nonmaleficence ought to dictate that a merciful end to the 
sUffering be allowed. 
Common sense would also seem to dictate that if the validity 
of the slippery slope holds true, then our already established 
• 
rights of abortion and passive euthanasia have already placed us 
9 
• 
somewhere on the slope. And while passive euthanasia would be 
above active euthanasia in this "slope", it would hold that 
abortion would place well below euthanasia because of the lack of 
vOluntariness of the fetus and abortion for the reasons other than 
the fetus' or mother's life even farther down. 
EUTHANASIA: NOT A FORM OF HOMICIDE OR SUICIDE 
Euthanasia is not a random act, nor is it unintentional. Its 
effect (death) is the result of a cause (illness, pain, brain 
death). There is morality in the relief of sUffering, or no longer 
prolonging life. This is directly opposite to homicide and 
suicide, and to compare them with euthanasia is incoherent. 
Homicide is constituted by the deliberate taking of another's 
• life, and there is no justification for homicide. It is not based 
on any motive other than the self-interests of the murderer. This 
does not involve mercy or compassion, it is the outcome of a 
wanton disregard for the sanctity and value of human life. It 
violates another's right to live. 
Suicide, the intentional taking of one's life, is perhaps the 
most often compared with euthanasia. Sociologist Emile Durkheim 
identified two basic types of suicide: egoistic and altruistic 
(Fletcher, 1976,p.173). The closest we may come to contrasting 
euthanasia and suicide is in altruistic suicide. Although the 
suicide is altruistic, who is to gain the benefit of the act? If 
a terminally ill patient takes their own life for the financial 
• 
reasons of their family, it may be perceived as altruism. But in 
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this case, Leon Kass (1993) asks, "what principle of family am I 
enacting and endorsing with my 'altruistic suicide'" (p.380). This 
is not euthanasia in action or intent as it neglects mercy for the 
relief of endless pain. Altruistic suicide would also seem to 
bring about the connotation of one's duty to die to relieve the 
sUffering of someone other than the true sufferer. 
Suicide in any form lacks comparison with euthanasia. It 
lacks mercy. Suicide is most often the result of mental illness, 
egoistic reasons, or financial reasons. Mental illnesses can be 
controlled and a suicide due to mental illness is due to the 
illness itself, not the action of a competent person. Suicide for 
financial reasons is an opting out not due to the loss of 
personhood, but due to a monetary basis for the quality of life. 
• 
In all considerations, the term euthanasia cannot be applied 
to suicide or homicide due to the lack of regard for the sanctity 
of life (theistically or naturally) and the right to live. One who 
commits "suicide" to relieve pain is in all actuality committing 
voluntary euthanasia. 
AN ACTIVE EUTHANASIA PARADOX; ABORTION 
In discussing active euthanasia, we must discuss the already 
legal and morally accepted abortion. While abortion may be 
accepted, its acceptance is limited. So few people are in the 
middle ground of being both "Pro-Life" and "Pro-Choice". Divided 
among moral and religious lines, as is euthanasia, some morally 
• 
accept abortion while others do not. 
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Ethicist Joseph Fletcher finds abortion as passive, 
involuntary and direct euthanasia (1973,p.154). However, abortion 
is a deliberate act taken for the merciful reasons of either the 
mother or the fetus without consent of the fetus, thereby 
constituting active euthanasia. 
• 
A fetus aborted after amniocentesis shows a fatal genetic 
defect, or a certainty that the fetus will be born only to live a 
short, painful life is aborted as a merciful act for the fetus. An 
abortion in the case of danger to the health of the mother is a 
merciful act to spare the mother. Abortion in the case of rape and 
incest falls into a gray area (in respect to the fetus), but this 
is somewhat an act of mercy (or compassion) for the mother. If 
forced to take the fetus to term, it violates all aspects of the 
mother I s freedom of choice (autonomy). While it is morally 
justified, it is not in the merciful terms of euthanasia. 
In all cases of abortion there is a lack of consent from the 
fetus. Consent, looked at later in this paper, ought to be the 
primary concern in active euthanasia. The fetus has no voice, 
therefore, cannot consent. The decision is made in either the best 
interests of the mother, or the fetus, by a surrogate (the parents 
or physician). While this constitutes involuntary active 
euthanasia it is morally justified by its compassion and mercy. 
If we find abortion (for any reason) moral and a legal right, 
we ought to be able to find active euthanasia just as morally and 
legally acceptable. Both determine that there are certain physical 
• 
and qualitative aspects that constitute a minimum basis for a good 
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life. And both recognize that personhood begins at a point beyond 
conception and ends, in some cases, at a point prior to actual 
physiological death. Personhood is the constitution of life, and 
without personhood one only exists physiologically 
(Fletcher, 1974, p.163). A fetus, while physiologically alive, lacks 
personhood, therefore abortion for the reasons of mercy are morally 
acceptable. 
CONSENT	 AND AUTONOMY 
Who should consider active euthanasia, and can someone choose 
death for another? In all cases of euthanasia, active or passive, 
it must be the patient, and in the case of active euthanasia, 
always the patient through explicitly expressed consent. The 
•	 principle of autonomy must be respected in the patient's right to 
choose an end to pain and sUffering if there is no medicinal relief 
available. 
Passive euthanasia and abortion are legally and morally just 
under the principle of autonomy. In the Karen Quinlan case, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that Miss Quinlan had a 
constitutional right to refuse treatment, and this right could be 
exercised for her by her guardian or family (Grisez & Boyle, 
1979,p.284). This rUling specifically allowed passive euthanasia 
and established that consent can corne from either the individual or 
the guardian/family in the case of a formerly competent patient (as 
Quinlan was). This right to refuse medical treatment is expressed 
• 
in the American Medical Association's (AHA) Fundamental Elements of 
13 
• 
the Patient-Physician Relationship (Walters,1994,44).
 
For active euthanasia to become morally accepted, it must meet
 
the same standards as passive euthanasia. Explicit consent of a 
competent patient, permanent and irreversible physical pain, the 
inability to ever return to the same quality of life, and the 
concurrence of more than one physician that this pain is permanent. 
Of utmost importance is that it ought to only be the patient, never 
the doctor who seeks euthanasia as a cure. Active euthanasia ought 
to be an option for the patient, not for the physician. 
• 
It ought to never be considered that there is ever any duty 
for one to be euthanized when one becomes ill. It is an option 
only for the sufferer and based only upon his or her own 
conditions. In Thomas More's Utopia, from the 16th Century, this 
same concept is explicitly stated in that only the sufferer shall 
choose to be euthanized and it shall not be determined by anyone 
else (p.57). 
EUTHANASIA AND THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 
In the Hippocratic Oath there also exists a paradox concerning 
euthanasia. This oath states, "I will neither give a deadly drug 
to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this 
effect" (Walters,1994,43). This is an expressed banning of 
euthanasia to any physicians who have sworn to uphold it the 
Hippocratic Oath. The AMA's Fundamental Element forbids active 
euthanasia, but does recognize the right to refuse treatment 
• 
(p.44). The acknowledgement of this right to refuse treatment 
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recognizes one's right to determine the course of his life, or the 
ending of it. 
The argument that active euthanasia is a violation of the 
Hippocratic Oath is valid if one maintains the standards that 
Hippocrates has set forth. But this is hypocritical in the case of 
abortion. "Abortive remedies" are also expressly forbidden by the 
same oath and in the same paragraph as euthanasia. For one to 
disapprove of euthanasia and approve of abortion is incongruent if 
their basis is the oath. Some physicians do perform abortions, not 
all, but some do. Those that do perform abortions do so in 
violation of the Hippocratic Oath. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACTION AND INACTION 
•	 An ethical consideration of passive euthanasia, in finding it 
a moral act, is that death is a consequence of the terminal disease 
or injury. Some claim there is a moral difference of not acting to 
save a life, and deliberately doing something to end a life 
(Fletcher,1960,p.68), but if the consequence of one is the same as 
the other, and acted out in mercy and compassion, then it is only 
the means which differs. In "consequential" moral jUdgement, the 
end is a humane, dignified death, and a relief of SUffering. The 
means are justified by relieving the SUffering of the patient by 
allowing or causing physical death. The intentions of both passive 
and active euthanasia are the same, and both also require a 
decision, one to act deliberately, the other to not act. And when 
• 
both consequence and intent are the same, there is no moral 
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distinguishment in turning off a respirator and injection of a 
lethal drug. 
If the consequence of death were always bad, then death would 
never be acceptable in any case. Is killing in self-defense wrong? 
Is abortion always wrong? The consequence of death to the living 
is feared, but to one who is sUffering or already dying it is not 
feared (Fletcher,1960,p.62). For some, the only relief for their 
sUffering is in death. 
THE DOUBLE EFFECT AND EUTHANASIA 
• 
Another form of active euthanasia, obfuscated as the 
justifiable consequence of a good intention, is the double effect 
(Glover,1977,p.87). If a physician gives medication to a patient, 
or increases the dosage of medication, and knows that this may 
shorten the life of the sufferer, then the physician is morally 
just as the death is unintended. The intention is the immediate 
effect of pain relief, not the shortening of life. 
Death as a consequence in the double effect is unintended, but 
death as the consequence of euthanasia is intended. In the double 
effect, it is only the lack of intention that many use to justify 
the morality of the double effect. But in both, the consequences 
are the same, and if the consequence of death in active euthanasia 
is good (relief of suffering), it is as morally correct as the 
double effect. The only degree of separation is in the intent. 
The intention of euthanasia is a merciful death, the double 
• 
effect's intention is to relieve pain, but the causing of death (if 
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not intended), is morally just.
 
In Kantian, or deontological, theory of ethics, it is the not
 
the consequence of the action that is what makes the action moral. 
It is the intention which morally makes the act morally good or 
bad. In the double effect it is a duty to relieve the sUffering, 
and the consequence, shortening of life, is acceptable as it is not 
intended. 
• 
In the consequentialism feature of utilitarian ethics there is 
little difference in the moral acceptance of active euthanasia when 
compared with passive euthanasia and the double effect. In 
consequential ism, it is the consequences of the action that 
determine the act to be morally right or wrong. If the 
consequences of passive euthanasia, abortion and the double effect 
bring about death, and death in certain circumstances is good, then 
we should be able to find active euthanasia morally justified in 
certain circumstances. 
The double effect's moral acceptance is in the intention and 
not the consequence. However, if the consequence of death is known 
in both instances, what is the moral difference? Most ethical 
theories judge morality in terms of actions, duty or the 
consequence. In reality when are our intentions judged? Is a 
doctor who, while trying to save the life of a patient (good 
intentions) causes the death of the patient from a later infection 
jUdged on the intention or the consequence? It is the consequence 
that he inadvertently (or negligently through oversight) caused the 
• 
death for which he will be held accountable. What is a physician 
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who overprescribes a medication for a patient which results in an 
overdose held accountable for? Again, his intention of relief for 
the patient is moot. It is the consequence he will be held 
accountable for. 
What the double effect does allow for is for the unintended 
side effects of medical relief of suffering in certain situations. 
It is specific to when bad and good effects (consequences) occur 
and in euthanasia death (when justified and voluntary) is good 
(Beauchamp and Childress,1994,p.210). The principle of double 
effect is not a valid argument against euthanasia. It is simply 
active euthanasia except the consequence (death) is not immediate. 
DR. KEVORKIAN, 26 AND RISING 
•	 There is no one doctor more infamous in present day society 
than Dr. Jack Kevorkian. In May of 1990, Dr. Kevorkian aided Janet 
Adkins in the relief of her sUffering (Watts,1992,p.878). Mrs. 
Adkins suffered from Alzheimer I s induced dementia. Using the 
device Kevorkian supplied, she administered a lethal dose of 
potassium after being sedated by barbiturates. Kevorkian was 
charged with first degree murder. In December of that same year, 
the charges were dropped after the judge ruled that Kevorkian had 
not broken any laws (Washington Post,1990,p.A19). This was 
Kevorkian's first assisted euthanasia. 
By late 1993, Kevorkian had assisted in at least 17 cases of 
active euthanasia (Worthington, 1993,p.2) • In response to these 
• 
cases, Michigan lawmakers passed a law making active euthanasia a 
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felony. In May of 1993 this law was declared unconstitutional, but 
was stayed by an appeals court for further appeal (p.2). To put 
the law to the test, Kevorkian assisted in the euthanasia of Thomas 
Hyde. SUffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), Hyde 
inhaled carbon monoxide on August 4 from a device of Kevorkian's. 
Hyde released a clip that allowed the carbon monoxide to flow into 
a fitted mask. He did this with his only good hand (p.2). 
In a strange twist to this case, the very man assigned to 
prosecute Kevorkian, Wayne County Prosecutor Wayne 0'Hair, was 
sympathetic to legally allowing active euthanasia. While he did 
not approve of Kevorkian's disobeying the existing law, he stated 
that he would promote a measure for "physician-assisted suicides" 
(Worthington,1993,p.2).
• 
From that point to the present, Jack Kevorkian has not yet 
been convicted in the 26 "assisted suicides" in which he has 
"assisted". In most cases, the charges have been dropped. In 
January 1995, Kevorkian's remaining charges were dropped as well 
(New York Times,1995,p.12). Through either the lack of laws, or 
the acquittal by jurors (some of whom wept for Thomas Hyde), Dr. 
Kevorkian remains free. 
While Kevorkian is able to skirt around the legal system, his 
assistance in these cases of euthanasia is not without some 
criticism. The largest criticism is Kevorkian I s lack of a 
doctor/patient relationship (Beauchamp and Childress,1994,p.238). 
Dr. Kevorkian has been sought out by the sufferers that he has 
• 
assisted due to both the lack of a legal euthanasia system and Dr. 
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Kevorkian's public notoriety. The media has been his largest 
advertiser. If there is anyone who can ever be termed as a 
champion of euthanasia rights in America, it is Jack Kevorkian: 
"Dr. Death". 
THE NETHERLANDS SYSTEM OF ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
The Netherlands is the only country which permits active 
euthanasia on request; however, the system is not one that would be 
permissible in the united states. The Dutch system did not start 
through law, but through a "de facto" arrangement twenty years ago 
in which prosecutors would not prosecute physicians for active 
euthanasia (Shapiro,1994,33). 
It is	 estimated that more than 30,000 people in the 
•	 Netherlands carry plastic living wills specifying active 
euthanasia. The media calls them "credit cards for easy death" 
(Fenigsen,1989,SOO). In 1990, there were 2,700 cases of physician 
assisted active euthanasia. In 1,040 of these, there was no 
consent from the patient, it was the doctors who decided for the 
patient (Shapiro,1994,33). 
In 1994 a new Dutch law took effect for active euthanasia, it 
allows involuntary active euthanasia if the doctor can argue it is 
what the patient wanted (Shapiro, 1994, 34) . While this legally 
validates the system, it makes it morally apprehensible. It is not 
the doctor who should determine that euthanasia is warranted, it is 
the patient who must decide. This form of involuntary euthanasia 
• 
is now called "crypthanasia" (Fenigsen,199 ,p.S02). 
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The moral problems with the euthanasia practiced in the 
Netherlands is the fact that it is not necessarily the patient who 
decides that the sUffering must end by death. If physicians are 
allowed to decide, it then allows the slippery slope to develop. 
Kass notes that, "Physicians are always tired by patients slipping 
or not getting better. Once they think of death as a treatment 
option, then physicians simply give into their weaknesses" 
(Shapiro,1994,33). The determination by someone other than the 
sufferer and if physicians do see euthanasia as a "treatment", then 
the society would be well on its way down the slippery slope, if 
not at the bottom. To be morally acceptable, it must be the 
patient's determination, not the physician. It violates the 
autonomy of the individual for anyone else to determine the course 
• 
of another's life (or death). 
LEGALIZATION OF ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
Legalizing or permitting active euthanasia through 
decriminalization (the act of not prosecuting, as in suicide) 
is morally correct. However hideous death may be to one, may not 
be to another. We must respect the autonomy of one who makes an 
informed, competent decision that this is to be their end, their 
relief. Conversely, we must respect another's opinion that 
euthanasia is not what they want. Clear, informed, and competent 
consent must be the grounds for active euthanasia. Anything less 
is not acceptable. If this consent is not present, then no one 
• 
else can make that decision. 
21 
• 
Is it humane to allow sUffering? Is it humane to force one to 
die an undignified dehumanized death? Is it humane to force one 
who suffers intolerable pain to commit "suicide" (Which carries 
larger social costs) instead of having the viable and moral 
alternative of medical euthanasia? Must we force family and loved 
ones to end the pain of their loved ones, such as the 21 mercy 
killings by family members in 1985 (Spencer,1986,p.2)? 
Euthanasia allows one to die in a dignified way. It is the 
only moral, humane thing to do when medicine cannot relieve the 
pain, and the terminally SUffering cannot go on any longer. When 
one has determined that they can no longer endure the SUffering and 
pain, it ought to be acceptable for individual to choose euthanasia 
as the last measure. This choice must be made by the individual 
• 
and no one else. 
Fletcher (1977) foresees the legalization of active euthanasia 
in America and that it will one day be socially accepted (p.158). 
If it is indeed to become law, it must be for only those who choose 
it. This choice must be made by a competent patient who asks for 
it, and is advised of all other possible alternatives (hospices, 
experimental medications, double-effect dosages, etc.). Only after 
those conditions are met can one elect active euthanasia as the 
merciful relief of pain and SUffering. 
Leon Kass (1993), who is staunchly opposed to euthanasia, 
correctly argues, we do not have a "right to die", what we do have 
is a right to live a good life (Beauchamp,p.504). In passive 
• 
euthanasia we recognize that, and the only difference between 
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active and passive euthanasia is action and non-action. And as 
Fletcher (1960) asks, "What, morally, is the difference between 
doing nothing to keep the patient alive, and giving a fatal 
dose?"(p.68). In both cases the intentions and the consequences 
are the same. As Kant said, "If we will the end we will the 
means" (Fletcher,1960,p. 68) . Morally, action and non-action are the 
same if both the intentions (as seen in the double effect) and the 
consequences are the same: a merciful death. Death is both the 
intentions and consequences of passive and active euthanasia. 
After unsuccessful attempts to legalize active euthanasia in 
California and Washington, Oregon voters passed an initiative to 
allow it. Immediately it went to the court system challenged by 
right to life movements and was struck down by the court. These 
• 
laws are the correct way to allow euthanasia, not the Dutch system 
of "nolle prosequi" (no prosecution). Even those physicians in the 
Netherlands found guilty of violating the existing euthanasia laws 
are not given any punishment (Fenigsen, 1989,p.501). 
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION'S MOVE TOWARD EUTHANASIA 
The American Medical Association's (AMA) stance on euthanasia 
is mixed. It allows for the foregoing of life-sustaining 
treatments, but it does not allow the "intentional termination" of 
life for merciful reasons (Beauchamp and Childress,1994,p.227). 
Again we can find use of intention in separating the difference 
between passive and active euthanasia, but both are the intentional 
• 
termination of life and the only difference is the action. 
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Now there may be a shift in the AMA's policy. The AMA ethics 
council has recently published a report that supports the removal 
of organs for donation from anencephalic babies prior to the 
infant's death to ensure the vitality of the organs for transplant 
(Krauthammer,1995,p.3B). The ethics council argument is based on 
the anencephalic infant's lack of personhood and that it cannot 
feel any pain (p.3B). 
If the AMA adopts this view as acceptable, then it surely is 
a "foot in the door" for the AMA' s acceptance of the right of 
active euthanasia for all patients. The intentional euthanasia of 
an anencephalic baby is active euthanasia, and with the exception 
of voluntariness, follows the same moral principles: lack of 
personhood and terminal suffering. Just as in abortion,
• 
vOluntariness cannot be gained from the infant or fetus. If the 
AMA does accept the principle of euthanizing the anencephalic baby 
and not active euthanasia, then it will merely be allowing the 
euthanization for an altruistic cause (organ donations) and will 
ignore mercy and humaneness. It would also disregard voluntary 
euthanasia while incongruously accepting involuntary euthanasia. 
CONCLUSION 
Voluntary euthanasia is not the only answer to all of the 
problems for those who suffer. Hospices and improved analgesia 
minimize the need for euthanasia (Gillon,1969,67). While research 
and technology make great strides everyday, there exist diseases 
• 
which wrack a body with tremendous and constant pain. Hideous 
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diseases that take away all dignity for the sufferer. Diseases 
which some fear more than death, as they make death unnatural, slow 
and painful. 
No one truly wants to see the taking of life for any reason, 
but there are those people to whom death comes as a relief. To 
allow them to choose death over pain is more easily justified than 
watching a slow and unmerciful death (Fletcher,1973,p.149). How 
many more family members must be forced to end the pain; honest 
people who have never committed any crime before? How many more 
times does Dr. Kevorkian need to go to court to be found to have 
broken no law or be tried by a sympathetic prosecutor and acquitted 
by a sympathetic jury? 
• 
If euthanasia becomes legal it should only be between the 
patient who chooses and a physician who agrees that it is the last 
choice. Euthanasia must be voluntarily sought out by a competent 
patient, it should not be a "prescription" for doctors to utilize. 
There is no dignity in a death that is labeled a suicide or 
homicide when it was in fact justified euthanasia. The death is a 
consequence of the illness or injury, and while the means 
supposedly differ from passive euthanasia, the intent is the same: 
Death. Euthanasia allows one to die a merciful death, relieved of 
pain, and in the dignity and nobility of the person they are, not 
what they will cease to be. 
Euthanasia is not of any benefit to society, it ought never be 
treated as a way of saving money or medical resources. Its only 
• 
benefit is to the sufferer who is relieved mercifully of his/her 
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pain. There is a right to life for all, and no one has a "duty to 
die" (Shapiro,1994, p.34). Just as in the case of abortion, it can 
not be imposed as a duty to doctors who do not want to perform it. 
To treat it as a means of any thing other than bringing about a 
merciful death with dignity is to treat human life itself as based 
on a financial condition. 
As we near the end of the century laws are being passed by 
voter initiatives to allow active euthanasia (only to be struck 
down by courts), courts cannot convict Jack Kevorkian and some 
progressive diseases which cause debilitating untreatable pain 
remain incurable. Court decisions have bounced back and forth on 
the legal right to euthanasia. In the moral determination of 
active euthanasia, the legal right and morally accepted passive 
•	 euthanasia and abortion have no real consequential differences from 
active euthanasia. Death is death in all cases, and all are based 
on a quality of life, relief of suffering and the lack of 
personhood. Laws must be passed which explicitly set the standards 
of active euthanasia so that there can be a legitimate 
doctor/patient relationship and no one will have to seek out a Dr. 
Kevorkian. For some, there exist no other alternatives. To them 
death has become acceptable. 
"When all usefulness is over, when one is assured of 
an imminent and unavoidable death, it is the simplest 
of human rights to choose a quick and easy death in 
place of	 a slow and horrible one . ... Believing this choice 
to be of social service in promoting wider views on this 
subject, I have preferred chloroform to cancer." 
•	 
Dr. Charlotte Gilman, 1939 
26 
• Major Religions' Beliefs on Euthanasia 1 Religion Active Euthanasia Passive Euthanasia 
Judaism Against Allowed 
Roman Catholic Against Allowed Z 
Greek Orthodox Against Allowed 
Russian Orthodx Against Allowed 
Lutheran Against Allowed 3 
Methodist Against Allowed 4 
Mennonite Against No position 
Church of Christ "Sub jUdice" Allowed 5 
Mormon Against Against
Baptist Against Yes 
Jehovah witness Against Do not OPPOSy 6 
Hinduism No position No position 
Buddhism Against Against B 
Khrisna No position No position 9 
Islam No position No position 
1 All data extrapolated from Larue,G.A. ,1985, Euthanasia and 
Religion.
• Z Christian teaching that sUffering before death has a special place in God's saving plan (p.39). 
3 The Synod affirms the positive benefits of sUffering 
(p.64). 
4 Recognize the "right to die in dignity"(p.87). 
5 Believe in the "dignity of life" (p. 113) • 
6 Believe in strict caution of "no hope of recovery" 
(p.1l7). 
7 Believe that a man may retire from life to "seek 
self-deliverance" (p.134) . 
B Believe in a "natural dying trajectory", may assume 
• 
against euthanasia (p.139) 
9 Euthanasia would interfere with divine plan, "pain and 
sUffering reduce sin"(p.141). 
• 
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